

# **Example for seminar.sty**

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## **Information overload = “Too much” information**

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Do you want to read them now?

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2. People *should* receive less information.

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A tax  $\tau$  on communication is said to support  $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}(c)$  if  $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}(c)$  is an equilibrium for  $\Gamma(c + \tau)$ .

**Proposition 6.** Assume  $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}(c)$  is not an equilibrium for  $\Gamma(c)$ .

1. If  $\text{supp}(\gamma) = [0, 1]^n$ , there is no tax that supports  $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}(c)$ .
2. If  $\text{supp}(\gamma) = S^{n-1}$ , there is a tax that supports  $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}(c)$  if and only if  $m = 1$ ,  $p_j > c \forall j$ , and
  - (a)  $n = 2$ ; or
  - (b)  $n = 3$  and  $p_i^{-1} + p_j^{-1} \geq p_k^{-1}$  for all distinct  $i, j, k$ ; or
  - (c)  $n = 4$  and  $p_1 = p_2 = p_3 = p_4$ .

# Architecture

